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(Hypothetical) Communication in
(Hypothetical) Context

GARY LAWSON*

I will start with the second of our two "group minds" problems,
involving potentially differing understandings of fruit, because I think it
is conceptually simpler, or at least more amenable to an answer, than is
the first problem.
The precise question is how I would handle the problem of application
of the fruit tax to tomatoes and kiwi if that problem came before me as a
judge. That specification of interpretative role is crucial.
At the outset, we need one very important piece of information that is
not provided: What is the governmental form of Lex? If Lex is a tyrannical
oligarchy, in which judges who rule against the wishes of certain powerful
legislators will be summarily executed, I would probably rule in whatever
way minimized my chances of being executed. Which legislators are
most in control of the machinery of violence in Lex? That is an
empirical question that cannot be answered on these facts. If Lex were an
evil-for example, socialist-regime that was not so depraved that it
routinely executed judges who do not properly serve the regime's agenda, I
would probably rule in whatever way most undermined the regime without
getting me or my family sent to a gulag. Again, it is an empirical question
that we cannot answer on these facts which course of action will most
undermine the evil regime.
But let us assume that Lex is some form of Western-style democracy or
republic at least vaguely resembling the United States or the United Kingdom
©2021 Gary Lawson. Philip S. Beck Professor, Boston University School of
*
Law. I am grateful to Larry Alexander for inviting me to think about these perhaps intractable
problems.
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that has not (quite yet) slid fully into a socialist abyss so irredeemably evil
that even implicit support for it is morally unacceptable,' so that rule-of-law
values still have some chance, in a normative calculus, of offsetting the
moral imperative of promoting substantive freedom. In that setting, there
is a powerful-not inevitable or unanswerable, but powerful-normative
case for deciding statutory questions by ascertaining the communicative
meaning of the relevant texts. A full justification would require a detailed
theory of adjudication, taking into account everything from precedent
to natural law to rule-of-law values, and that is not happening in five pages.
Accordingly, I am re-framing the question just a bit from "What do you
decide?" to "What do you decide is the communicative meaning of the
text?," leaving open the possibility that the morally correct thing to do is
to pay no attention at all to the law's communicative meaning. Given that
re-framing:
The law emerged from a multimember legislature, so the relevant
communicative meaning is the "intention" of a hypothetical single entity
into which each of the concrete minds that compose the legislature is
integrated.2 The question is: To what things and relations in the world
does the concept "fruit" refer? Because the hypothetical entity's utterances
are externally directed-a law in such a regime is not a private diary, or a
poem, or a chain novel-the most sensible background interpretative
norm, given the metaphysical character of group intentions, is that the
hypothetical legislative mind "intends" that the criteria for inclusion or
exclusion in a concept come from a hypothetical group mind that is the
object of the communication.3 That is not an inevitable background rule;
one can certainly, in principle, have a communicative act in which the
nature of the exercise is for the listener to try to figure out the conceptual
criteria employed by the speaker. Indeed, that is surely the theoretical
ground and starting point for any act of communication: If the listener is
not trying to figure out what the speaker intends, it is hard to describe what
is happening as an attempt at communication. The question, however, is
whether the best account of the speaker's intention is precisely that the

1.

There is a good-faith argument that the United States has already regressed so

far into socialism that, as a moral matter, it is in Galt's Gulch territory right now. I don't
think it is quite there yet, but I am open to persuasion on the point.
2.
For more detail on the metaphysics ofjoint intentions, see Gary Lawson & Guy
Seidman, Originalismas a LegalEnterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENTARY 47 (2006).
3.
If we go back to the tyrannical oligarchy, it is quite possible that the best guess
about the object of any law emerging from that hypothetical group mind is to sow terror
and confusion among the populace, so that one is maximizing the number of potential
lawbreakers who the State can oppress. A judge trying to ascertain the communicative content
of such a law would choose that meaning which maximizes terror and arbitrary regime
power.
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listener's conceptual framework should govern in the event of possible
ambiguity in the criteria for inclusion in a concept, so that a first -order
reference to speaker's intention leads in practice to second-order employment
of listener's intention.4 The more the legal system is oriented towards
social coordination rather than tyrannical control, the more likely the
communicative enterprise is going to be listener- rather than speakerdriven in those circumstances where different conceptual criteria could
lead to different results. Again, that is far from an inevitable conclusion;
it is actually an empirical question which background rule best fits the
way in which communication is handled, as a presumptive matter, in such
contexts. To some extent, the answer is not separable from the underlying
theory of government. If legislators are viewed as rulers or guardians and
the populace is viewed as subjects or wards, then a speaker-oriented approach
becomes more plausible as the background assumption driving communicative
meaning. If the underlying theory of government is agency-based, with
the populace as principal and the legislators as agents, the likely presumption
is reversed. So, the proper answer to the communicative question cannot really"
be given without some assumptions about the underlying governmental
theory (here referring to "governmental theory" as a descriptive rather than
normative idea).
But taking listener's (or public) meaning as the guide, the question
becomes an empirical one about whether a hypothetically constructed public
mind would regard tomatoes and/or kiwi as "fruit." In the contemporary
Western world, the latter is pretty easy: The answer is yes, kiwi is a fruit.
It is a staple in many fruit salads. The former is a factual question in which
I would welcome briefing from the parties. Would a fruit salad afficionado
be startled to find a tomato nestled among the melons, berries, and kiwi?
Quite possibly yes.
In the absence of good information one way or the other about the
criteria for inclusion in the concept "fruit," I would say "no" to application of
the tomato tax, on the theory that the burden of proof is always on the
person asserting a change in the status quo, which in this case would be
the taxing authority. Ambiguity works against application of a law, and
if there is genuine empirical ambiguity about the criteria for inclusion of
something as "fruit," the law cannot be given effect in particular
adjudications. Thus, it is possible that I would ultimately decide the case

4.

See Lawrence B. Solum, IntellectualHistory as ConstitutionalTheory, 101 VA.

L. REV. 1111, 1136 (2015).
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based on evidentiary allocations of burdens of proof rather than ascertainment
of the communicative meaning of the text.
The second problem, involving our old friend The Peerless, is to me
much harder, because the kinds of default rules involving burdens of proof
that can be used to resolve disputes in an adjudicative setting are not
necessarily available in these cases. The firm of "Smith and Jones," a
hypothetical mind, has given an instruction that has two possible referents.
The key question is what assumptions are most plausible as background
interpretative norms for communications from "Smith and Jones." The
empirical question that determines the appropriate background rule is: What
is the entity trying to accomplish? Is the entity seeking to maximize
profits? In that case, the referent of the term "Peerless" is probably the
boat that can ship goods most economically. But if the entity is seeking
to maximize the opportunities for graft of its owners-and that is a perfectly
possible goal if the entity is a partnership, as it is in this case, or a close
corporation-Mary may have a genuinely irresolvable dilemma. There are
two equally good possibilities for graft, and the entity could equally mean
either one. In that case, Mary has not been given a determinate instruction,
beyond the instruction that shipping using one of the two boats is a good
idea. Is her instruction in that setting to do nothing or to pick either one
of the two possible boats? That is probably a question that can only be
answered by reference to the custom or practice in agency arrangements of
that kind. The operative legal context, in other words, might provide a
background communicative principle. In the absence of any such
background principle, I would say that Mary has not actually been given
an instruction at all. The words are sound and fury signifying nothing.
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